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The entanglements of freedom: Simón Bolívar’s Jamaica Letter and its 
socio-political context (1810–1819) 
 
By looking at the Jamaica Letter and other political writings of the period, this 
article explores some problematic aspects of Bolívar’s thought regarding the 
capacity of Spanish Americans for self-government and the place assigned to 
marginalized ethnic groups within the revolutionary political process. Although it 
is nowadays revered as a great Americanist manifesto, Bolívar’s Jamaica Letter 
was ultimately an attempt to reassure Britain of the commercial benefits that a 
military intervention in favour of Spanish American Independence would bring to 
her geopolitical ambitions. However, because of the reliance on slave workforce 
for its rich plantation economy, and in view of its pivotal commercial role in the 
Caribbean, Bolívar had also to guarantee the stability of British economic 
interests in the region. This also applied to New Granada (present-day Colombia) 
and Venezuela, where creole opposition to the abolition of slavery was strong. 
Thus, Bolívar avoided the issue of slavery and took a cautious approach with 
regard to the future status of Indian communities. In this respect, the Jamaica 
Letter reveals the inexistence of a unified national body during the Wars of 
Independence as well as the socio-political tensions entwined within such a 
fragmented and heterogeneous milieu. 
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1. Introduction 
Simón Bolívar’s Jamaica Letter is framed within a period of political revolt against 
Bourbon rule in Spanish America. Because of the radical administrative reforms 
introduced by the Crown during the second half of the eighteenth century, high-rank 
civil, military and ecclesiastical posts had become available almost exclusively to 
Peninsular Spaniards. High taxation, together with restrictions on trade, agriculture, 
mining and industry, were also a source of anger among the inhabitants of the colonies.1 
Yet, they did not initially call for a revolution that would bring about their political 
independence. On the contrary, large sectors of the population viewed the colonial 
authorities as guarantors of their property and status. In Peru, the Indian rebellion led by 
Tupac Amaru II had shown that these could not be taken for granted, and similar events 
in other parts of the continent and the Caribbean during the last decade of the eighteenth 
century—particularly the black slave revolt in the rich French colony of Saint 
Domingue, which caused great human and material devastation—convinced the creole 
elites that nothing would be more disastrous for their interests and security than the 
absence of the colonial order itself. This was perceived as the primary structure capable 
of containing the social and ethnic war that would otherwise erupt in the region.2 
Indeed, referring to Francisco de Miranda’s expeditionary force to liberate 
Venezuela in 1806, the young Bolívar, who was at that time in Paris, expressed his own 
fears with regard to the consequences that such an action could have on the colony: 
‘Toutes les nouvelles qu’on nous donne sur l’expédition de Miranda sont un peu tristes, 
car on prétend qu’il a le projet de soulever le pays, ce qui peut causer beaucoup de mal 
aux habitants de la Colonie’ [The news we get about Miranda’s expedition are rather 
distressing as they say that he plans to liberate the country, which will cause much harm 
to the inhabitants of the colony].3 In effect, by appealing to a large sector of the 
Venezuelan population, Miranda inadvertently created the mistrust of the creole elite 
with regard to the social consequences of his ‘egalitarian’ principles.4 Spanish colonial 
society, particularly in Venezuela, was built on a strict hierarchical order where family 
lineage and racial purity alone determined the place of individuals in the social edifice. 
Miranda knew this from personal experience;5 still, he relied on the assumption that 
popular support for his cause would be secured in the colonies through ideological 
persuasion, an expectation that proved to be completely erroneous.6 
It was an external circumstance which triggered the chain of events that would 
compel Bolívar and other Spanish American Patriots to take the reins of their own 
political and economic affairs. The Napoleonic invasion of Spain in February 1808 and 
the subsequent abdication first of Charles IV and then of his son, Ferdinand VII, raised 
an outcry of popular indignation against the French throughout the Iberian Peninsula. In 
order to protect their national sovereignty the Spaniards formed local councils (juntas), 
which led to the creation of the representative national Cortes.7 As a logical reaction to 
the political turmoil in the Peninsula, Spanish Americans soon felt the need to establish 
autonomous provincial juntas to protect their own interests throughout the colonial 
territories. These juntas showed varying degrees of allegiance to the Spanish authorities, 
Lima and Mexico remaining under strong Royalist influence. In January 1809, 
moreover, the Spanish Central Junta decreed that the Spanish dominions in the Indies 
were no longer to be considered colonies but an integral part of the monarchy.8 Most 
creoles, however, distrusted the Central Junta’s good intentions or the supposed legal 
equality it claimed to have established between americanos and peninsulares.9 Thus, 
after two failed attempts to create an autonomous local junta, in April 1810 the Province 
of Caracas (Captaincy-General of Venezuela) succeeded in overthrowing the Spanish 
authorities. In an ingenious statement, the Caracas Junta maintained its formal 
obedience to the monarch but refused to accept the legitimacy of the Regency, the 
Spanish national governing body that was set up in January 1810 to fill the gap left by 
the abdication of Ferdinand VII.10  
Not all the Venezuelan provinces followed the example of Caracas. This 
situation was to weaken the effectiveness of the first Constituent Congress of the 
Venezuelan Provinces, which declared absolute Independence from Spain in July 1811 
and the creation of a federal republic, namely, the United States of Venezuela. In the 
end, the lack of political agreement towards a common goal and the subsequent 
fragmentation of the Confederation sealed its fate: civil war became inevitable and by 
July 1812, after a devastating earthquake that destroyed Caracas, the dream of a 
harmonious, prosperous and free Venezuela had completely vanished. Francisco de 
Miranda, who had returned from London less than two years earlier and was now 
fighting the Royalist forces as commander in chief of the Venezuelan Confederation, 
was thus forced to accept the terms of a capitulation recognising the Cortes and the 
reinstatement of Spanish rule.11 
 As a privileged and enlightened young man with strong commercial interests in 
mining and agriculture, Bolívar was eager to play a leading role in the emancipation of 
his homeland and the creation of a prosperous liberal order that would guarantee the 
rights, property and security of its people. In June 1810, the newly created Junta 
dispatched him on an official mission to London together with Luis López Méndez and 
Andrés Bello. Bolívar, who took upon himself the financial costs of the journey, was to 
seek British protection from the menace of a French invasion of Venezuela and to 
reassure the British government that the Caracas Junta remained faithful to the Spanish 
Crown. Bolívar, nevertheless, disregarded the Junta’s directives and requested instead 
British recognition of the Venezuelan Independence. Richard Wellesley—brother of 
Lord Wellington—refused Bolívar’s request. Despite his poor opinion of the Spanish 
government, Wellesley, who was then Foreign Secretary, remained adamant in his view 
that a full recognition of the Regency was the appropriate course of action. Now that 
Britain and Spain were allied against a common enemy, there was no chance of 
obtaining British support in a political revolt against colonial rule in Spanish America.12 
International politics aside, the incident is interesting in that it shows Bolívar’s radical 
stance with regard to the question of independence: he wanted an absolute break with 
Spain (with or without the support of Britain) and would not agree to compromise.  
Despite his failure to obtain British backing for Independence, Bolívar’s 
discussions in London secured the protection of Caracas against a possible French 
invasion and, thanks to British ‘neutrality’, opened up a channel of communication that 
would enable the rebel forces in Venezuela to obtain indirect military and financial aid 
in the years to come (for this purpose, López Méndez was allowed to remain in London 
with the task of recruiting British mercenaries to fight in South America).13 At a 
personal level, his stay in London gave him the opportunity to meet a number of 
Spanish American Patriots living in exile, among them Francisco de Miranda, who 
introduced Bolívar to prominent British political and intellectual figures. Since the 
1790s, Miranda had spent all his energies trying to convince the British Government to 
support his plans for the emancipation of the Spanish colonies, but the volatile nature of 
Anglo-Spanish diplomacy had made this impossible. Miranda, however, was not 
entirely trusted by the British nor by the Venezuelan elite in Caracas. In particular, his 
military involvement in the French Revolution during the years 1792–1793 meant that 
he was seen as a threat to the political stability of the colonies with their strong grasp on 
social privileges and economic interests.14 From this perspective, the example of the 
French Revolution was considered a deterrent rather than an encouragement for 
rebellion in South America. After all, had not the ideas about liberty and equality 
unleashed the fall of Saint Domingue? Miranda, who actually shared this assessment of 
the Revolution (not least because of the persecution he suffered in France under the 
Girondists), was nevertheless able to make a good impression on Bolívar.15 In fact, it 
might not be entirely far-fetched to think that he could have influenced Bolívar’s hard 
stance in the discussions with Wellesley. At any rate, Miranda finally abandoned the 
hope of leading a British-backed military expedition to liberate the colonies and decided 
instead to join the revolutionaries in Caracas. His military and diplomatic experience, 
combined with his intellectual background, accredited, in his view, a well-deserved 
place in the political life of his patria. 
Soon after the conversations with Wellesley were over, Bolívar returned to 
Venezuela where he joined, together with Miranda, the military struggle for the 
liberation of his country. Tragically, with the capitulation of July 1812 and the 
disbandment of the army, Bolívar felt that Miranda had betrayed the cause for 
independence.16 He was therefore instrumental in the latter’s capture by the Royalists, 
who kept him imprisoned until his death in Cadiz four years later. 
 
2. The Cartagena Manifesto 
After the Capitulation of San Mateo Bolívar sought refuge in Cartagena, the main 
colonial port in New Granada (present-day Colombia) and now the administrative 
centre of a nominally independent republic. It was there that he delivered his first 
important speech on political theory, the Cartagena Manifesto, a reflection on the 
Venezuelan first republican experiment and its failures. The document outlines 
Bolívar’s political creed, not only with regard to the principles of government he 
believed were appropriate for a free Venezuelan republic but also with respect to the 
affirmation of power and authority over, as he put it, the ‘ignorant people’ who are 
incapable by themselves of reinforcing their legitimate rights (‘los pueblos estúpidos 
que desconocen el valor de sus derechos’).17 In the Manifesto, he openly criticises the 
lack of vigour exerted by the Caracas junta in subduing the dissident provinces and 
mocks the ‘idealist’ axioms of its members, who confused philosophical speculation 
with practical government: 
 
Los códigos que consultaban nuestros magistrados no eran los que podían enseñarles la 
ciencia práctica del Gobierno, sino los que han formado ciertos buenos visionarios que, 
imaginándose repúblicas aéreas, han procurado alcanzar la perfección política, 
presuponiendo la perfectibilidad del linaje humano. 
 
[The operating codes our leaders consulted weren’t those they might have learned from 
any practical science of governance, but those formulated by certain worthy visionaries 
who, conceiving some ethereal republics, sought to achieve political perfection on the 
presumption of the perfectibility of the human species.]18 
 
Bolívar’s pragmatism and his conviction that a politico-administrative agreement 
throughout the Venezuelan territory was necessary for the conservation of Independence 
explains his insistence on the need for a robust and centralised form of government. He 
never changed his mind on this point. The Venezuelan Constitution of 1811 had been 
drafted along the lines of the North American federal constitution.19 Bolívar, who had 
been opposed to the adoption of a federal system because of the separatist tendencies of 
the provinces and their capacity to act against the interests of the nation (‘exaltando el 
espíritu de provincia que forzosamente debilita y entorpece el de nación’),20 could now 
blame the lack of a solid, centralised power for the evils suffered during the First 
Republic: 
 
Pero lo que debilitó más el Gobierno de Venezuela fue la forma federal que adoptó, 
siguiendo las máximas exageradas de los derechos del hombre, que autorizándolo para que 
se rija por sí mismo, rompe los pactos sociales y constituye a las naciones en anarquía. […] 
Generalmente hablando, todavía nuestros conciudadanos no se hallan en aptitud de ejercer 
por sí mismos y ampliamente sus derechos; porque carecen de las virtudes políticas que 
caracterizan al verdadero republicano; virtudes que no se adquieren en los gobiernos 
absolutos, en donde se desconocen los derechos y los deberes del ciudadano. 
 
[But what most weakened the government of Venezuela was the federal structure it 
adopted, embodying the exaggerated notion of the rights of man. By stipulating that each 
man should rule himself, this idea undermines social compacts and constitutes nations in a 
state of anarchy. […] Generally speaking, our fellow citizens are not yet ready to take on 
the full and independent exercise of their rights, because they lack the political virtues 
marking the true citizen of a republic. Such virtues are impossible to attain in absolutist 
governments, where there is no training in the rights or duties of citizenship.]21 
 
 Indeed, as opposed to English colonial rule in North America—where civil 
rights and liberties had been enjoyed—Spanish Americans had not been able to develop 
a collective sense of duty and responsibility on which to base a common political goal.22 
These notions were ineffective because Spanish colonial society had been built upon the 
premise of social and racial difference, a situation that resulted in the marginalisation of 
large sectors of the population and their consequent inability to represent themselves as 
being part of a political community that went beyond narrow regional or ethnic 
interests.23 Given the complexities of such a fragmented, ill-prepared society, it was 
clear that in the short term neither federalism nor a universal electoral system would be 
suitable for the people of Venezuela: 
 
Las elecciones populares hechas por los rústicos del campo y por los intrigantes moradores 
de las ciudades, añaden un obstáculo más a la práctica de la federación entre nosotros, 
porque los unos son tan ignorantes que hacen sus votaciones maquinalmente, y los otros 
tan ambiciosos que todo lo convierten en facción; por lo que jamás se vio en Venezuela 
una votación libre y acertada, lo que ponía el gobierno en manos de hombres ya desafectos 
a la causa, ya ineptos, ya inmorales. 
 
[The popular elections conducted by the rustic inhabitants of the countryside and by the 
intriguers living in the cities pose an additional obstacle to the practice of federation 
among us, because the former are so ignorant that they vote mechanically while the latter 
are so ambitious that they turn everything into factions. Therefore, we never experienced a 
free, correct election in Venezuela, so that the government ended up in the hands of men 
who were incompetent, corrupt, or uncommitted to the cause of independence.]24 
 
 Bolívar’s complaint about the inexistence of a republican political ethos in 
Spanish America will have fundamental repercussions in his constitutional projects. In 
his view, the greatest challenge posed by the Spanish American Wars of Independence 
came from within. While war could eventually bring peace (through a military solution 
to the conflict), only the rational acceptance of a new constitutional order on the part of 
each individual citizen would be able to create the conditions under which a free and 
stable republic could prosper for the benefit of all. As he stated in 1818: 
 
Sois todos venezolanos, hijos de una misma Patria, miembros de una misma sociedad, y 
ciudadanos de una misma República. El clamor de Venezuela es libertad y paz: nuestras 
armas conquistarán la paz, y vuestra sabiduría nos dará la libertad. 
 
[You are all Venezuelans, natives of the same country, members of the same society, and 
citizens of the same Republic. The clamour of Venezuela is liberty and peace; our arms 
shall conquer peace, and your wisdom will give us liberty.]25  
 
This implied the consolidation of a political community where citizens would respect 
each other on account of their shared rights and responsibilities before the law. In order 
to contribute positively to society Spanish Americans needed to act unselfishly and for 
the benefit of the common good. This was essential both for the protection of the region 
against the threat of a Spanish reconquest and to stop the spread of a fratricidal war 
between cities and provinces. Yet, the prevailing state of corruption and opportunism in 
the political and administrative sphere represented a serious obstacle in the struggle for 
independence and paved the way for social and political anarchy.26 If Spanish colonial 
rule had curtailed the growth of liberal institutions, the Wars of Independence had 
brought a vicious and harmful sense of political freedom. Amid so many conflicting 
interests, Bolívar felt that only a centralised and authoritarian government could save 
the republican project from self-destruction. 
 
3. Jamaica and the political impasse 
When Bolívar wrote the Jamaica Letter he had behind him a trail of glory and defeat. 
Through the military campaign initiated in 1813 he was able to liberate Caracas from 
Spanish rule. Yet, the persistence of old factions determined once again the failure of 
his achievements. By September 1814 Bolívar was back in New Granada. This, too, was 
the scene of politico-administrative divisions. Following his military success in Santa 
Fe (the former capital of the viceroyalty), Bolívar marched north where he encountered 
rebellious opposition from Cartagena. As he laid siege to the Caribbean city in March 
1815, the Royalist forces that still dominated the northern province of Santa Marta were 
able to expand their control over the area. In order to avoid greater evils, Bolívar 
abandoned the command of the New Granadan troops and sailed for Jamaica hoping to 
find in the British colony an alternative path for the solution of the Venezuelan 
predicament.27 
 During his eight-month exile in Jamaica, Bolívar sought financial, military and 
logistic support from Britain: ‘The balance of world power and the interests of Great 
Britain are perfectly in accord with the salvation of America!’—he states in a letter to 
Richard Wellesley, desperately asking for British succour in the struggle for 
Independence—. ‘England [...] will see prosperity flow back to her shores from this 
hemisphere which must depend, almost exclusively, on her as benefactress.’28 The cause 
of Bolívar’s despair was the return of Ferdinand VII to the throne (back in March 1814) 
and his determination to subdue at any cost the rebel colonies in Spanish America. With 
that purpose, Pablo Morillo, an experienced army officer in command of a large military 
force, reached the coast of Venezuela in March 1815. By the time Bolívar was writing 
the Jamaica Letter in September of that year, Caracas had already fallen to Morillo’s 
army; Cartagena would fall early in December, followed by Santa Fe in May 1816.29 
The Jamaica Letter, then, is essentially a moral and political justification of the 
Wars of Independence and a call for international support in the struggle for the 
emancipation of the Spanish colonies. Although it is nowadays revered as a great 
Americanist manifesto, Bolívar’s targeted audience was certainly not to be found among 
the native population in Spanish America.30 As his letters to Wellesley and others show, 
Bolívar’s ultimate plan was to reassure the British government of the commercial 
benefits that a military intervention in favour of the rebel cause would bring to its 
geopolitical interests. Writing to Maxwell Hyslop, a prominent English merchant based 
in Jamaica, Bolívar goes as far as to suggest the possibility of handing over Panama and 
Nicaragua to Britain—an idea that would have outraged Miranda, who always 
distrusted its imperialist ambitions.31 
From a polemical point of view, the Jamaica Letter presents a grim vision of the 
Conquest and colonisation of the New World, the predicament of its inhabitants under 
Bourbon rule, and the possible political organisation of the colonies once the ties with 
Spain had been severed and a liberal and prosperous economic order was established in 
the Spanish American territories.32 Although in his appeal for international support 
Bolívar underscores the legitimacy of the rebel cause, his outlook regarding the political 
aptitude of the Spanish American people for self-rule—indeed, their willingness to 
develop adequate republican institutions—is nevertheless extremely pessimistic, as the 
following statement reveals: 
 
¿Seremos nosotros capaces de mantener en su verdadero equilibrio la difícil carga de una 
república? ¿Se puede concebir que un pueblo recientemente desencadenado se lance a la 
esfera de la libertad sin que, como a Ícaro, se le deshagan las alas y recaiga en el abismo? 
Tal prodigio es inconcebible, nunca visto. Por consiguiente, no hay un raciocinio verosímil 
que nos halague con esta esperanza. 
 
[Shall we be able to maintain, in its true equilibrium, the difficult charge of a republic? Is it 
to be conceived, that a people but just released from their chains can fly at once into the 
sphere of liberty? Like Icarus, their wings would be loosened, and they would refall into 
the abyss. Such a prodigy is inconceivable, in fact never seen; consequently, there is no 
reasonable argument which can bear us out in this expectation.]33 
 
It was paradoxical that the very people who had demanded their Independence just 
a few years earlier should now prove unfit for the challenges that lie ahead. If Bolívar 
was seeking the support of Britain—as indeed he was—it is puzzling that he should 
raise such a devastating caveat against the project of emancipation. There is a distant 
echo here of eighteenth-century perceptions of the inhabitants of the New World (such 
as the pseudo-scientific theories of Buffon, De Pauw and the like), in which Spanish 
American peoples were stigmatised as inferior or barbaric races incapable of progress 
and self-government.34 In the eyes of European and North American observers, this 
negative appraisal constituted a serious indictment against creoles for it questioned their 
capacity to create civilized and industrious societies—no previous experience of 
political liberty and self-rule could attest to the contrary—. This meant a fundamental 
flaw in the political development of Spanish Americans, a weakness that manifested 
itself through their unruliness, arbitrariness and personal ambition, an issue frequently 
mentioned by Bolívar in his private correspondence.35 Yet, as far as the Jamaica Letter 
is concerned, Bolívar’s accusation against his compatriots explains his anxious (and 
rather problematic) desire for Britain to take her place as benefactress of the future 
republics: ‘Luego que seamos fuertes, bajo los auspicios de una nación liberal que nos 
preste su protección, se nos verá de acuerdo cultivar las virtudes y los talentos que 
conducen a la gloria’ [As soon as we become strong, and under the auspices of a liberal 
nation that will afford us protection, we shall be united {in cultivating the virtues and 
talents that lead to glory}].36 In other words, the political immaturity of Spanish 
Americans at that historical junction justified in Bolívar’s eyes the need for a foreign 
power to oversee the development of the young republics for as long as the 
circumstances should require it, thus creating the perfect conditions for a new kind of 
colonial dependency. 
Could obstacles of such a magnitude be overcome through the implementation of 
liberal institutions alone? While civil liberty depended on the solidity of the political 
institutions to be adopted, the latter had to be based on the actual preparedness of 
Spanish Americans for freedom. In this respect, Bolívar’s distrust of his own people 
shares similarities with Thomas Jefferson’s assessment of the Spanish American 
predicament and prefigures G. W. F. Hegel’s criticism of the new republics: ‘I feared 
from the beginning that these people were not yet sufficiently enlightened for self-
government; and that after wading through blood and slaughter, they would end in 
military tyrannies, more or less numerous.’37 This situation created a vicious circle for 
which Bolívar had yet to find a political remedy. However, despite the reproach of his 
adversaries (and the condemnatory verdict of later generations), he always resisted the 
idea of military dictatorship as a cure for the malady.38 As he stated in his address to the 
Angostura Congress, his project was fixed in the conviction that a truly republican order 
in South America required the consolidation of civil and political liberties based on a 
new kind of education for its citizens; this implied the creation of a new society built on 
civic virtue and moral responsibility.39 This was Bolívar’s aim, even if in the short term 
the concrete socio-political circumstances required a degree of ‘enlightened’ 
authoritarianism in order to keep the republic safe: ‘If, during the last years of our 
disastrous struggle a plenitude of power has been invested with me, now that we have a 
prospect of tranquillity, however distant, I wish to show that it has been the 
consequence of necessity and of circumstances and not of intrigues or any pretensions 
on my part.’40 It is against the backdrop of civil war, administrative corruption and a 
widespread absence of republican values, therefore, that his ideas on governance and 
autocracy need to be seen. In my opinion, the latter was an attempt to overcome those 
obstacles rather than an end in itself.41 
 
4. The social dimension 
Because of the reliance on slave workforce for her rich sugar and cacao plantations, and 
in view of her pivotal commercial role in the Caribbean, Bolívar had to recognize that 
the guarantee of social order and security was paramount to British economic interests 
in Jamaica. This also applied to certain regions in New Granada and Venezuela where 
creole opposition to the abolition of slavery was essential for the survival of their 
plantation economy.42 With regard to the question of black slavery, then, Bolívar had to 
find a middle term that would reconcile the various political and economic interests that 
were at stake in the region. His sojourn in Haiti between 15 December 1815 and 16 
April 1816, where he received a generous military support from President Alexandre 
Pétion, forced him to consider the problem under a new light.43 More than any 
considerations of humanity and justice, the promise of freedom in exchange for the 
slaves’ enlisting in the Patriot militias was now a matter of sheer necessity.44 Bolívar—
like Antonio Nariño in New Granada in 1813—had to come to terms with the fact that 
without the recruitment of slaves and free people of colour in general, a military success 
over the Royalist army was uncertain. The Royalist forces themselves had been 
successful in recruiting black slaves for their troops, some of which had fought bravely 
against the Patriot armies. Since slave and mulatto opposition to the republican cause 
had played a significant role in the fall of the first and second republic, it was now 
essential to gain their support in order to avoid further damage.45 To be sure, the fortune 
of the republican project depended on this; yet, Bolívar twisted the argument by making 
conscription a precondition of freedom as much as a moral duty on the part of the slaves 
themselves. As he put it: ‘No habrá, pues, más esclavos en Venezuela que los que 
quieran serlo’ [There will no longer be any slaves in Venezuela except those who wish 
to remain so].46 In the quest for the independence of Venezuela and New Granada after 
1816, Bolívar’s position vis-à-vis the issue of slave emancipation would continue to be 
entirely pragmatic and, at times, somewhat cynical. Writing to Santander a few years 
later, he says: ‘Cada vez me confirmo más en la utilidad de sacar esclavos para el 
servicio; el primero que los llama es su libertador’ [I am day by day more convinced 
about the usefulness of recruiting slaves for the army; the first one to call upon them is 
their Liberator].47 As far as the slaves was concerned, however, his offer must have 
meant little more than a certain death in the battlefield. Bolívar himself confirms this 
suspicion; in a letter to Santander written a month earlier, he argues: ‘¿Será justo que 
mueran solamente los hombres libres por emancipar a los esclavos? ¿No será útil que 
estos adquieran sus derechos en el campo de batalla, y que se disminuya su peligroso 
número por un medio poderoso y legítimo?’ [Can it be just that only free men should 
die for the emancipation of the slaves? Would it not be better that the latter win their 
rights on the field of battle and that their dangerous numbers be reduced through a 
powerful and legitimate action?].48 On the other hand, late colonial experience in some 
regions of Venezuela and New Granada shows that life as a fugitive could offer slaves 
and other subaltern groups a better option for survival and self-affirmation, one which 
did not exclude the prospect of organising their own rebellions against white rule.49 
Just as Bolívar avoided the issue of slavery in the Jamaica Letter he also took a 
cautious approach with regard to the status of Indian communities in the future 
independent countries (the terms ‘slavery’ and ‘enslavement’ appear only as a 
metaphorical description of the oppression suffered by the creoles under colonial rule, a 
rhetorical device that had become commonplace in Patriot discourse since 1810).50 
Given that this was not an indigenous or peasant uprising in the style of the Andean 
rebellions of the 1780s, the administrative vacuum created by the separation of the 
colonies from Spain could theoretically put into question the legitimacy of the creole 
class to take over the political control of indigenous peoples in various parts of the 
continent. Indeed, in a manuscript to the editor of the Royal Gazette written during his 
stay in Jamaica, Bolívar was all too keen to emphasize the ‘natural’ subordination of 
Indians and blacks with respect to the ‘superior’ moral and intellectual capacity of their 
white masters.51 Bolívar’s aim in writing this document was twofold: firstly, to reassure 
Britain that the conditions for Independence and economic prosperity in the Spanish 
colonies were secured under creole leadership; secondly, to indicate that the ‘amicable’ 
relationship between creoles and the castes guaranteed the peace and security of the new 
republics. After all—he argues in the Jamaica Letter— had not the Spanish 
Conquistadors been rewarded by the king with land and other royal privileges for their 
exclusive enjoyment and those of their descendants, so that ‘they should take the 
“indigenes” under their protection as vassals’?52 By the same token, the South American 
Wars of Independence were fought for the promotion and defence of creole interests, 
even if the ranks of the troops included a wide sector of the population each with their 
own set of grievances and aspirations.53 Yet, the traditional characterization of Indians 
as belonging to a primitive or inferior race that had been left outside the course of 
history after the Spanish Conquest, was largely used as a justification for their 
marginalisation from the core structure of civil society.54 This implied an affirmation of 
the creoles’ colonial heritage at the expense of Indian rights, including the claims of 
indigenous communities to land and self-determination.55 Bolívar states it bluntly: 
 
Yo considero el estado actual de la América, como cuando desplomado el Imperio 
Romano cada desmembración formó un sistema político, conforme a sus intereses y 
situación o siguiendo la ambición particular de algunos jefes, familias, o corporaciones; 
con esta notable diferencia, que aquellos miembros dispersos volvían a restablecer sus 
antiguas naciones con las alteraciones que exigían las cosas o los sucesos; mas nosotros, 
que apenas conservamos vestigios de lo que en otro tiempo fue, y que por otra parte no 
somos indios ni europeos, sino una especie media entre los legítimos propietarios del país 
y los usurpadores españoles: en suma, siendo nosotros americanos por nacimiento y 
nuestros derechos los de Europa, tenemos que disputar éstos a los del país y que 
mantenernos en él contra la invasión de los invasores.  
 
[I consider the present state of America as similar to that of imperial Rome, when she was 
decaying: Every division formed for itself a political system, agreeable to its interests and 
situation, or followed the particular ambition of certain chiefs, families, or corporations; 
with this remarkable difference, that the dispersed tribes re-established their ancient 
customs, with such alterations as were required by circumstances. But we, hardly 
preserving a vestige of our former state, neither Indians nor Europeans, but a race between 
the original natives and the European Spaniards; being by birth Americans, and our rights 
those of Europe, we have to dispute and fight for these contending interests, and to 
persevere in our endeavours notwithstanding the opposition of our invaders.]56 
 
Bolívar’s comparison between the fall of the Roman Empire and the dissolution of 
the Spanish colonial order allows him to formulate a crucial political argument: while 
the disintegration of the former empire led to the restoration of autonomous political 
communities in the Italian Peninsula (and elsewhere), the separation of the colonies 
from the Spanish Crown revealed the absence of a unified national body capable of 
reconstituting a historical form of political organisation based on freedom and self-
rule.57 Such a condition could no longer be claimed by the descendants of the pre-
Columbian peoples (whose political institutions had been practically destroyed) nor by 
the creoles (whose status as colonial subjects had impeded a genuine experience of 
political freedom). While some commentators of Bolívar’s social thought have 
interpreted the original Spanish expression ‘una especie media’ as a reference to the 
future development of a mestizo society in Spanish America that will reconcile its ethnic 
differences (an idea he will present in his address to the Angostura Congress, although 
not in particularly strong or unambiguous terms),58 there is no direct connection in the 
Jamaica Letter between his call for Independence and the consolidation of a 
homogeneous national body after the emancipation of the colonies. Within the political 
context of the document, the phrase ‘una especie media’ implies a juridical rather than a 
socio-biological perspective (the use of the term ‘race’ in the English translation of the 
Letter published in Jamaica can therefore be misleading). At no point does Bolívar 
suggest here the existence of a large mestizo population that would take over the 
prerogatives of the creole class. While he did not publicly promote discriminatory social 
policies, the creation of a harmonious political community formed by free and equal 
americanos was at this stage totally unattainable. Social reality in Spanish America was 
altogether of a different kind: it was determined by a multiplicity of regional and ethnic 
identities struggling against each other for their own political and economic interests.59 
In this respect, the Jamaica Letter reveals the lack of a unified national body during the 
Wars of Independence as well as the socio-political tensions entwined within such a 
fragmented and heterogeneous milieu. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In his project for a free and united continent, Bolívar expressed in 1815 the need for a 
confederation of Spanish American states linked together by a common political goal: 
 
Es una idea grandiosa pretender formar de todo el Mundo Nuevo una sola nación con un 
solo vínculo que ligue sus partes entre sí y con el todo. […] Mas no es posible, porque 
climas remotos, situaciones diversas, intereses opuestos, caracteres desemejantes, dividen a 
la América. [...] Esta especie de corporación podrá tener lugar en alguna época dichosa de 
nuestra regeneración; otra esperanza es infundada. 
 
[It is a most magnificent idea, that of forming the new world into one great nation, linked 
together by one great chain. […] But it is impossible, for distant regions, various 
situations, contending interests, and dissimilar characters, divide America. [...] This sort of 
corporation may very possibly occur during some happy epoch of our regeneracy: Any 
other expectation is futile.]60 
 
This Bolivarian ideal has come down through generations of Americanist 
manifestos as a grandiose political scheme that would protect Spanish American 
countries from the threat of imperialist intrusions (Bolívar would nonetheless be keen 
on having the presence of British delegates at the Panama Congress of 1826). However, 
far from assuming the factuality of a Pan-American union, Bolívar knew that its 
concrete realisation in the former Spanish colonies required the consolidation of civil 
societies based on the exercise of political virtue.61 This was needed in order to 
strengthen a sense of trust and solidarity among its nations. Hence, the notion that the 
political ‘regeneration’ of the people is a prerequisite for their progress as civilized 
nations of the world suggests a rather cautious view with regard to the success of such a 
scheme, at least in the foreseeable future (I interpret the expression ‘our regeneracy’ in 
socio-political terms, that is, as the ideal point in history in which Spanish American 
societies will realize their capacity for freedom as rational political communities). In the 
short run, nevertheless, the difficulty of creating stable political institutions capable of 
guaranteeing unity, prosperity and mutual cooperation—whether regional, national or 
Pan-American—constituted a palpable threat to the ideals of the revolution. In order to 
achieve a true and lasting Independence, social and political integration, coupled with a 
solid education in civic norms and values, was urgently needed. As Bolívar put it: ‘Si 
hay alguna violencia justa, es aquella que se emplea en hacer a los hombres buenos y, 
por consiguiente, felices; y no hay libertad legítima sino cuando ésta se dirige a honrar 
la humanidad y a perfeccionarle su suerte’ [If there is any just violence it is that which 
is employed in making men good and, in consequence, free; and there is no legitimate 
freedom except when it aims to honour humanity and improve its lot].62 This was one of 
the greatest challenges to be met in Spanish America; Bolívar set out to confront it in 
his first constitutional project, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1819, which will be the 
basis for the Constitution of ‘Great’ Colombia two years later. 
In the period 1816–1819, therefore, a new conception of the social contract began 
to take shape in Bolívar’s thought. If the arguments presented in the Jamaica Letter 
applied principles of natural law in order to legitimize the political hegemony of the 
creole class over the vast majority of the native population, by 1819 Bolívar was able to 
formulate a republican constitutional order based on the legal equality of all members of 
society which included the abolition of slavery and, a few years later, the legal 
protection of basic indigenous rights.63 This meant a crucial turn from the notion of 
natural rights as the basis of the social pact to an idea of society which relied, more than 
ever before in Bolívar’s political doctrine, on the application of civil rights as a means 
to protect the liberty and equality of its citizens.64 This is stated clearly in the Angostura 
Address:  
 
La naturaleza hace a los hombres desiguales, en genio, temperamento, fuerzas y caracteres. 
Las leyes corrigen esta diferencia porque colocan al individuo en la sociedad para que la 
educación, la industria, las artes, los servicios, las virtudes le den una igualdad ficticia, 
propiamente llamada política y social. 
 
[Nature makes men unequal, in intelligence, temperament, strength, and character. The 
laws correct this difference because they place the individual in society so that education, 
industry, the arts, the services and the virtues can give him a fictitious equality that is 
properly called political and social.]65 
 
Despite a number of measures proposed by the Liberator to curtail popular 
participation in the future political process (such as the distinction between ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ citizenship), the implications of his social doctrine proved to be too 
revolutionary for his time. In a deeply hierarchical and racially stratified society 
economically dependent on slave work force, the ideas of universal freedom and 
equality were doomed to meet strong opposition. Not surprisingly, the Venezuelan 
Congress watered down Bolívar’s plea for the abolition of slavery.66 It is for his 
biographers to determine whether or not his intentions in proclaiming the liberty of all 
men were sincere. In this article, I have argued that the Liberator’s actions obeyed a 
fundamental conviction about the nature of republican government and the means 
through which it could be adopted in Spanish America. In an attempt to overcome the 
political limitations that colonial experience had imposed on its inhabitants, and placing 
his faith in the capacity of the human race for moral and intellectual development, 
Bolívar’s constitutional project of 1819 opened up the way to radical social and political 
reform, a path that was frustrated by the very prejudices it tried to confront. 
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